Choreographed Knowledges - Revision history

R Intan: /* 2011–2012 */

2025-08-03T16:43:02Z

2011–2012

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	1. University autonomy opens the door to the commercialisation of education;		1. University autonomy opens the door to the commercialisation of education;

	2. The regulation and authorisation of foreign universities operating within Indonesia’s borders undermine the state's obligation to provide higher education for its citizens;		2. The regulation and authorisation of foreign universities operating within Indonesia’s borders undermine the state's obligation to provide higher education for its citizens;

	3. The law deconstructs higher education in Indonesia; from a public mandate to enlighten the nation into an enterprise aligned with business interests.		3. The law deconstructs higher education in Indonesia; from a public mandate to enlighten the nation into an enterprise aligned with business interests.

R Intan: /* 2015 - now */

2025-08-03T16:42:39Z

2015 - now

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	==2015 - now==		==2015 - now==
	'''~~Lorem ipsum~~'''		'''Single market, double standards: Who gets to be what in ASEAN?'''

	~~Dolor sit amet~~		Since 31 December 2015, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) has been officially in effect. Its primary goal: to establish a single market and production base in Southeast Asia—eliminating barriers to the trade of goods, services, and investment, while enabling the mobility of skilled professionals such as doctors, nurses, architects, and accountants. However, the impact has been uneven. The Philippines, with a well-established labour export system and regulations such as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act, has been better prepared to compete in the regional market. Indonesia, by contrast, continues to struggle with aligning vocational education with industrial needs, and many of its migrant workers remain trapped in high-risk informal sectors.

			Law No. 18 of 2017 on the Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers has been enacted, yet its protections remain incomplete. Meanwhile, in 2018, the government issued Presidential Regulation No. 20 on the Use of Foreign Workers, which was criticised for being too permissive and for sidelining Indonesian migrant workers themselves. Protests followed, including a major demonstration on Labour Day, 1 May 2018. As Indonesia opens its doors to foreign workers in the name of investment, thousands of its citizens are being sent abroad as migrant workers.

			This situation highlights the gap between the rhetoric of competitiveness and the reality of the job market. Other countries have taken different paths: South Korea, for instance, responded to a demographic crisis and extreme work culture by capping the national working hours at 52 per week—rejecting the logic of endless labour in favour of more sustainable productivity. In Indonesia, however, work is still largely seen as a mere economic driver, rather than a right worth safeguarding. In the context of the AEC and global investment, who truly benefits from this mobility?

R Intan: /* 2011, 2015, 2017, & 2018 */

2025-08-03T16:42:10Z

2011, 2015, 2017, & 2018

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	==2011, 2015, 2017, & 2018==		==2011, 2015, 2017, & 2018==
	'''~~Lorem ipsum~~'''		'''The masterplan for accelerated development and its realisation'''

	~~Dolor sit amet~~		Rapid demographic growth and urbanisation prompted the government to devise a long-term strategy. In 2011, it launched the Masterplan for the Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia’s Economic Development (MP3EI), with the ambitious goal of raising per capita income to USD 15,000. Achieving this target required meeting two main conditions: first, raising the economic growth rate to an average of 8–9% between 2015 and 2025; and second, keeping inflation under control at an average of 3% up to 2025.

			To achieve these aims, the government had an extensive list of homeworks to do. Among them were: improving the quality of human resources, enhancing the capacity for science and technology mastery, and strengthening economic competitiveness based on natural resources and human capital.

			In his speech marking Indonesia’s 72nd Independence Day, President Joko Widodo claimed that “the quality of human development in Indonesia has produced encouraging results,” citing improvements in Indonesia’s Indeks Pembangunan Manusia [Human Development Index] (IPM). He expressed optimism that human capital development would continue, particularly through vocational education and training.

			In reality, however, the 2015 Asian Development Bank report revealed that more than half or approximately 52% of Indonesian workers were underqualified for the standards required by their jobs. The Global Competitiveness Index 2016–2017 showed that Indonesia was in urgent need of reforms in education and workforce preparedness. The country ranked 63rd out of 138 in the pillar of Higher Education and Training, and 108th in Labour Market Efficiency.

			Echoing these findings, the World Bank also concluded that Indonesia’s human resource competitiveness remained weak. Although school enrolment rates had increased significantly, actual student learning outcomes lagged behind those of other countries—dampening Indonesia’s competitiveness in the global economy.

	==2015 - now==		==2015 - now==

R Intan: /* 2011–2012 */

2025-08-03T16:41:40Z

2011–2012

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	==2011–2012==		==2011–2012==
	'''~~Lorem ipsum~~'''		'''Liberalisation of education, part 3'''

	~~Dolor sit amet~~		Since the enactment of higher education autonomy in 1999, the government’s efforts to liberalise the education system in Indonesia, particularly in the higher education sector, have become increasingly pronounced. Education reform has followed the trajectory of neoliberal interests. This is evident in the passing of Law No. 12 of 2012 on Higher Education, which contains a number of problematic provisions.

			The concept of financial autonomy in higher education institutions is specifically regulated in Article 64, which addresses non-academic autonomy; Article 65, which grants State Universities with Legal Entity (PTN-BH) status the authority to establish business ventures and manage endowment funds; and Article 85, which explicitly states that the cost of higher education shall be the full responsibility of the students.

			Law No. 12 of 2012 also laid the legal foundation for the entry of foreign universities into Indonesia. The government issued a number of regulations for foreign private entities wishing to establish higher education institutions within the country, including the designation of specific regions, types, and academic programmes that may be operated. It is emphasised that any cooperation must be balanced and aimed at improving national competitiveness.

			Nevertheless, these decisions only reinforce the concerns raised by education sociologist Henry Giroux, who argues that neoliberal policies in higher education across developed countries have fundamentally altered the mission and vision of universities. Rather than cultivating critical thought or advancing the public good, higher education institutions are increasingly treated as machinery for fulfilling the economic expectations of students and society.

			This reality has not gone unnoticed. Law No. 12 of 2012 on Higher Education has been subject to legal challenges for its perceived incompatibility with the 1945 Constitution, including the following criticisms:

			1. University autonomy opens the door to the commercialisation of education;
			2. The regulation and authorisation of foreign universities operating within Indonesia’s borders undermine the state's obligation to provide higher education for its citizens;
			3. The law deconstructs higher education in Indonesia; from a public mandate to enlighten the nation into an enterprise aligned with business interests.

	==2011, 2015, 2017, & 2018==		==2011, 2015, 2017, & 2018==

R Intan: /* 2010 & 2014 */

2025-08-03T16:41:06Z

2010 & 2014

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	==2010 & 2014==		==2010 & 2014==
	'''~~Lorem ipsum~~'''		'''State funding support for education'''

	~~Dolor sit amet~~		Amid education policies that increasingly leaned toward market mechanisms, the government sought to fulfil the constitutional mandate of the 1945 Constitution by channelling substantial public funds into the education sector. This initiative is aligned with the National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN), outlined in the Masterplan for the Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia’s Economic Development, 2011–2025 (MP3EI). It was a state response to the challenges posed by Indonesia’s vast geography, high demographic growth, and rapid urbanisation.

			It began with the establishment of the Indonesia Endowment Fund for Education (LPDP) under the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Through this institution, the government allocated a Permanent Education Fund (DPA) to finance scholarships for high-achieving students. These included the Beasiswa Pendidikan Indonesia [Indonesia Education Scholarship] (BPI), Beasiswa Afirmasi [Affirmative Scholarships], and Beasiswa Presiden Republik Indonesia [the Presidential Scholarship of the Republic of Indonesia] (BPRI).

			Furthermore, the Full Education Pathway Scholarship was introduced for students from low-income families—starting from primary school (SD) through to junior and senior secondary school (SMP and SMA), and ultimately public universities (PTN). For primary to secondary levels, the government launched the Poor Student Aid (BSM) scheme, and for university students, the BIDIKMISI [Scholarship for Underprivileged and High-Achieving Students]. The Presidential Scholarship programme followed in 2014, targeting postgraduate (master’s and doctoral) students.

			In the same year, the government introduced the Indonesia Smart Card (KIP) to support the national nine-year compulsory education programme. KIP was designed to cover pupils’ basic needs, such as school bags, shoes, uniforms, or transportation costs between home and school. Previously, both direct school expenses; fees, books, uniforms, and stationery—and indirect costs—transport, private tutoring, pocket money, and other daily needs—had long been key reasons students were unable to continue their education.

	==2011–2012==		==2011–2012==

R Intan: /* 2008 */

2025-08-03T16:40:37Z

2008

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	==2008==		==2008==
	'''~~Lorem ipsum~~'''		'''From self-sufficiency to dependence: Care labour migration agreements in East Asia'''

	~~Dolor sit amet~~		A major milestone in the history of labour migration in East Asia was the signing of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between Japan and both Indonesia and the Philippines—marking the first time Japan legally and selectively opened its doors to foreign workers in the elderly care sector. The agreement emerged amidst a demographic crisis: an ageing population, declining birth rates, and a shrinking domestic workforce since the early 1990s.

			Through the EPA, Indonesia and the Philippines began sending nurses and caregivers who had undergone Japanese language training, professional certification, and a customised curriculum. Workers were required to pass Japan’s national examination within three years in order to continue working legally. This process shifted the role of the state: from merely educating for domestic needs to becoming a facilitator of labour export for a global care regime.

			In the Philippines, the EPA built upon a long-established pathway for skilled migration. In Indonesia, the agreement spurred the restructuring of vocational education and the development of new infrastructure: vocational schools, training agencies, and formal migration channels. Labour was no longer viewed simply as a source of unskilled work, but rather as certified professionals, products of a state-regulated curriculum tailored to foreign demand.

			The EPA paved the way for other East Asian countries such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea to develop similar models. In other words, labour migration—once criminalised—is now institutionalised, but only within “social” and feminised sectors like caregiving. This marks a quiet transformation from labour nationalism to a regional migration architecture.

	==2010 & 2014==		==2010 & 2014==

R Intan: /* 2007–2008 */

2025-08-03T16:39:58Z

2007–2008

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	==2007–2008==		==2007–2008==
	'''~~Lorem ipsum~~'''		'''The global crisis and the layered vulnerability of Indonesian Migrant Workers (TKI)'''

	~~Dolor sit amet~~		The global financial crisis, which began in the United States, rippled across the world and dealt a heavy blow to Indonesia’s economy. As a country dependent on foreign investment, raw material exports, and cheap labour, Indonesia faced massive capital flight and waves of layoffs. By mid-2009, 57,000 formal sector workers had lost their jobs.

			This crisis also revealed how vulnerability is unequally distributed. Young people and women bore the heaviest impact. In 2008, youth unemployment (ages 15–24) reached 23.3%, and they were among the first to be laid off. The same was true for Indonesian migrant workers—most of whom are women—employed in informal or manufacturing sectors abroad. By December 2008, the government reported that 250,000 TKI were forcibly repatriated before their contracts ended. In many villages, remittances had served as a crucial economic safety net; when they disappeared, poverty sharply increased.

			Eric Maskin, Nobel Laureate in Economics (2007), warned that global economic openness only deepens inequality if not accompanied by improvements in workforce skills. The state must invest in education and job training, rather than simply boasting of economic growth figures.

			In Indonesia, formal vocational education—through vocational secondary schools (SMK) and polytechnics—as well as non-formal training at job training centres called Balai Latihan Kerja (BLK), should have offered a way forward. Yet in reality, their distribution is uneven, quality is inconsistent, and programmes often fail to respond to the actual needs of the labour market. At one point, SMK graduates even contributed the highest unemployment rates, proving that technical skills alone are not enough without clear career pathways and social protection.

			Rather than empowering workers, the vocational system often ends up reinforcing the logic of cheap labour supply for a flexible job market. When crisis hits, young workers, women, and migrants—groomed as disposable and pliable labour—are the first to be cast aside. The real question remains: who is our vocational system really working for?

	==2008==		==2008==

R Intan: /* 2005–2006 */

2025-08-03T16:39:26Z

2005–2006

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	==2005–2006==		==2005–2006==
	'''~~Lorem ipsum~~'''		'''Compulsory education, BOS, and ‘Affordable schools’'''

	~~Dolor sit amet~~		In 2005, the government launched the Bantuan Operasional Sekolah [School Operational Assistance] or BOS programme to ease the cost burden of basic education and expand access to schooling. BOS funds were allocated to primary and lower secondary schools to support the 9-year compulsory education programme, allowing schools to reduce or eliminate fees charged to students.

			This policy was introduced alongside the 2005–2009 National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN), which marked a new direction in post-Reformasi development, with a focus on improving human resource quality—especially through basic education. The commitment was reinforced through Presidential Instruction No. 5 of 2006 on accelerating compulsory education and eradicating illiteracy.

			However, expanded access did not always come with improved quality or equitable distribution. In the context of post–New Order decentralisation, the implementation of BOS often varied unevenly across regions. At the same time, a wave of low-cost private schools emerged—particularly in peri-urban and densely populated areas—operating with minimal standards. The state relied heavily on a per-capita funding logic (student-based funding), without addressing the structural inequalities between public schools, elite private institutions, and “economy” private schools.

	==2007–2008==		==2007–2008==

R Intan: /* 2005 */

2025-08-03T16:38:53Z

2005

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	==2005==		==2005==
	'''~~Lorem ipsum~~'''		'''‘National’ standards and the professionalisation of teachers'''

	~~Dolor sit amet~~		Through Government Regulation No. 19 of 2005, the state for the first time established National Education Standards—eight components covering curriculum content, learning processes, graduate competencies, educators and education staff, facilities and infrastructure, management, financing, and assessment. To implement this, the National Education Standards Agency (BSNP) was formed to draft the details and monitor their execution in the field.

			That same year, Law No. 14 of 2005 on Teachers and Lecturers reshaped the teaching profession. The minimum qualification was raised to a bachelor’s degree (S1/D4), and all teachers were required to undergo a certification process based on four core competencies: professional, pedagogical, social, and personal. Those who passed were promised a professional allowance. For those teaching in remote areas, additional incentives were offered.

			In practice, however, certification often became a mere administrative ritual. Many certified teachers received little to no follow-up or ongoing support. The professionalisation agenda turned into a project of formalisation, rather than substantive quality improvement. In the end, many teachers continued working under precarious conditions with heavy workloads—particularly contract teachers who were never formally appointed by the state. Outside major cities, ‘professionalism’ often meant working harder with fewer resources. Behind the jargon of ‘professionalisation’, the state has disciplined—rather than dignified—its educators.

	==2005–2006==		==2005–2006==

R Intan: /* 2003 */

2025-08-03T16:38:19Z

2003

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	==2003==		==2003==
	'''~~Lorem ipsum~~'''		'''The Constitutional Court and the decentralisation of education'''

	~~Dolor sit amet~~		The establishment of the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi or MK) through Law No. 23 of 2003 provided civil society with a new legal avenue to challenge and review legislation, including those relating to the education sector. Over time, the Court evolved into a kind of “final legislator”—not a body that creates policy, but a forum where the public can question policy directions that fail to serve the common good. One landmark case upheld by the Court was the affirmation of the state’s obligation to allocate 20% of the national budget (APBN) to education, a mandate previously often neglected.

			The state also enacted Law No. 32 and No. 33 of 2004 on Regional Governance and Fiscal Balance, which made education a mandatory responsibility of local governments, from primary to secondary levels. This decentralisation was intended to ensure that educational services aligned more closely with local needs. In practice, however, it had never been that simple—without sufficient human and financial resources, many regions experienced stagnation or even a decline in the quality of education services. As a result, educational inequality in Indonesia has only become more pronounced: where one studies increasingly determines what kind of future one might have.

	==2005==		==2005==